Not interested in nuclear weapons, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated last week that; “Our motto is nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none”. This comes in the wake of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report released on August 30. Iran develops new protocols for expansion of it’s uranium enrichment, starting with the new groups (2) of centrifuges-built near the holy city of Qom (site built under a mountain), which is an indicator of doubling the sites capacity after May. 3.5% to 20% purity levels of uranium are being stockpiled with no immediate use. Current train of thought is that they are planning to make an atomic bomb – 20% of uranium far outweighs Iran’s claim for making a reactor for medical isotopes. Category IR-1, based on a Dutch design, picked up by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan now operates 11000 centrifuges. Flawed international sanctions and surveillance, Iran still manages to acquire maraging steel and high strength aluminum from outside the country, and produce special metals domestically. The IR-1 centrifuges operating at half their potential are producing less enriched uranium. On an interjecting note Maryland’s Governor Martin O’Malley’s second economic trip to Israel is to be in November. Baltimore and it’s surrounding areas have 20 Israeli companies working on Israeli government related projects (uranium enrichment determent software (stuxnet upgrade)). Military history has shown that sanctions and treaties can be gotten around (after the treaty was signed with Germany following World War 1 (providing for it’s disarmament), and non aggression documents prior to World War 2-Lord Neville Chamberlain with Germany). The manufacturing process or the raw materials used creates quality problems. Iran has not put their advanced centrifuges online. Speculation says that 1) software is not up to speed, 2) new type of anti-stuxnet upgrade software is being designed and tested, 3) slowed to have speed makes the intellignece agencies think that they only have non up to date centrifuges, 4) harder to detect the uranium signatures, 5) utilize less electricity so as to not be detected, 6) making sure that the purity levels are at 20%, to be increased later, 7) less uranium waste material for detection, 8) key personnel shortage, 9) uranium logistics shortage, 10) prevent uranium cenrifuge breakdown-providing detection because of materials causing a paper trail, and 11) usage of Plutonium (as an alternate), and running the centrifuges at half speed to test the comparison with uranium in terms of enrichment purity. A fully operational nuclear weapon needs the production of nuclear materials that are compatible, to prevent contamination. The latest U.S. intelligence puts this as unclear. Upgrading to advanced centrifuges could have Iran speed up their purity level within months to 90%-enriched uranium (using their stockpiled inventory of 20% to weapons grade capability. Having five or six bombs made worth 90% enriched uranium would classify them as latent nuclear weapon state (actually tested or not). Even at 20% purity of enriched uranium gives Iran a nuclear weapon state dirty bombs). The site of Parchin is still highly contested; however IAEA inspectors still struggle to get into the facility-where satellite imagery reveals landscaping and construction activities-allegedly covering up past nuclear work. Past events showed obstruction and destruction of evidence at other sites. IAEA inspection tools and information from member states and the US have an idea what happened at Parchin. It was alleged that Iran used a steel chamber at the site to experiment on an “implosion” technique of squeezing a nuclear explosive (highly enriched uranium) into a critical mass using conventional explosives. This would be the smoking gun in question giving the US, Israel, NATO, and IAEA evidence of Iran’s nuclear intentions. Iran refuses to give into pressure despite politicians trying to help by declaring there is still time for diplomacy, sanctions, and military threats to succeed. Sidelined for several years Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Iran’s suspected chief nuclear bomb maker is brought back to work on these projects. A hypothesis is that he was placed into “protection”, because of the other nuclear scientist being assassinated by alleged Israeli dressed Iranians, and he was playing a de facto role in the directing leadership of the nuclear program development scheme. The IAEA report finalizes that Director-General Yukiya Amano “will continue to report as appropiate”. Iran’s nuclear program will be determined by whoever can pull it off. This author’s personal, HUMINT, and COMINT intelligence was in collaboration with his colleagues, 1) by a Baker Fellow and Director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute, and 2) a former top IAEA inspector who is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School Belfer Center.